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FINANCING OF TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS 
IN BELGIUM
In the early 1990s, a scandalous story about what became known as the 
Belgian Billionaire Gang running one of the biggest women trafficking 
rings in Western Europe (De Stoop, 1992) roused the nation. The ensuing 
public outrage promptly gave rise to a parliamentary committee of inquiry, 
set with the task of scrutinising the prevalent criminal policy on trafficking 
in persons (BE-E2; BE-E5) (Boels & Ponsaers, 2011). The multidisciplinary 
policy direction that to date typifies the Belgian response to the issue of 
human trafficking has its origin in the work of this committee of inquiry 
(BE-E2). On account of this early awareness of the issue, Belgium has 
taken on a pioneering role in dealing with this transgression (Boels & 
Ponsaers, 2011).
Following the law of 13 April 1995 on trafficking in human beings (THB), 
the legal framework on this type of misconduct has gone through 
a number of developments (DSB, 2015; GRETA, 2016). Contrary to 
the definition introduced by the UN Palermo Protocol (Efrat, 2016), 
the method of operation is not part of the Belgian delineation of 
human trafficking. Only the act and intent of exploitation are constituent 
elements of the crime, whereas the means of exploitation are considered 
as an aggravating factor (CGKRB, 2011). Using a relatively open concept 
in preference to an exhaustive list of illicit behaviours, the Belgian 
definition of human trafficking hinges on the exploitation itself rather 
than on the methods of exploitation (GRETA, 2016). Another point of 
divergence is the demarcation of labour exploitation. Labour exploitation 
is defined in a much broader sense than the term ”forced labour,” as 
labour exploitation is described in terms of working below the level 
of human dignity (GRETA, 2016; Leman & Janssens, 2015). As a matter 
of course, the qualification of inhumane circumstances leaves a broad 
margin of interpretation (CGKRB, 2011). Consequently, the distinction 
between bad employment practices and labour exploitation is at times 
far from clear-cut (de Jager, Hassani, & Pennings, 2016). Similarly, seeing 
that prostitution offences are generally de facto tolerated, an ambivalent 
legal situation is intrinsic to the matter of sexual exploitation as well 
(BE-E6; BE-E13).
As mentioned before, Belgium has broken ground in terms of implementing 
a multidisciplinary approach towards trafficking in persons (BE-E2; BE-E5) 
(OSCE, 2013). As a general rule, sexual exploitation is handled by the 
public prosecutor and the police forces. Conversely, the social inspection 
services and the labour prosecutor, a specialised branch of the public 
prosecution office, cover labour exploitation cases (BE-E2; BE-E3; BE-E11; 
BE-E13). As follows, social and labour inspectorates play an important 
role in tackling the issue of human trafficking, notably because they carry 
far-reaching investigative powers and significant expertise and experience 
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in this matter (de Jager et al., 2016; Leman & Janssens, 2015). The 
substantial involvement of these actors is indicative of Belgium’s distinct 
focus on labour exploitation (BE-E2; BE-E5). Going beyond pure law 
enforcement, a noteworthy materialisation of Belgium’s multidisciplinary 
approach is the Interdepartmental Coordination Cell embracing all actors 
involved in the fight against trafficking in persons, which is entrusted with 
the coordination of the policy on human trafficking (DSB, 2015).
Belgium is primarily known as a destination country and, to a lesser 
extent, as a transit country for human trafficking operations (Akee et 
al., 2014). As a source country, Belgium plays a minimal part (Shelley, 
2010), but on the whole is widely regarded as one of the most targeted 
countries by human traffickers (Balarezo, 2013; Europol, 2016). Conversely, 
Belgium also stands among the countries taking most action against 
human trafficking (Walk Free Foundation, 2016).
Trafficking in persons is an issue that has been brought into focus 
over twenty years ago, yet our understanding of the subject is far 
from complete. One facet that has been largely neglected is the 
financial dimension of human trafficking operations. In response to 
this knowledge gap, the present research report explores the financial 
management of trafficking in human beings in Belgium on the basis of 
a literature review, a document analysis of the human trafficking cases 
described by the Federal Migration Centre, which functions as the 
National Reporter on trafficking in human beings for Belgium, and face-
to-face interviews with both professionals who are well-informed on the 
subject of trafficking in persons and perpetrators convicted of trafficking 
offences.1 As regards the latter method, respondents were selected 
with a view to reflecting the diversity of the frontline practitioners, 
who are confronted with human trafficking cases on a day-to-day basis. 
The interviews were conducted by aid of a standardized interview 
protocol and subsequently analysed using computer-assisted qualitative 
data analysis software.
Like most forms of organised crime, trafficking in human beings crops 
up against a backdrop of envisioned profitability (Petrunov, 2011; 
Wheaton et al., 2010). To illustrate this point, the federal judicial police 
has estimated that the proceeds of human trafficking in Belgium writ 
large amount to nearly a billion euros per year (Delepière et al., 2013). 
In a related manner, sexual exploitation is deeply rooted in the sex 
industry, which has an estimated overall value of between €617 and 
€688 million (Adriaenssens et al., 2015). Labour exploitation, on the 
other hand, is intrinsic to a wide variety of economic sectors. Table 1 
1 The sources have been coded in order to preserve their anonymity. The first two letters of 
the code indicate the country, “E” indicates an expert, while “C” means criminal entrepreneur. 
The description of the background of the individual sources referenced can be found in the 
list of interviewees in the references section.
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indicates the most prominent sectors uncovered by the social inspection 
services in Belgium. Generally, industries that are on the nether side of 
the so called “three Ds’” touchstone, meaning they involve work that 
is dirty, difficult, or dangerous, and industries that are less regulated 
are more exposed to labour exploitation (Davies, 2017; Europol, 2017). 
The sectors most serviceable for the purpose of exploitation are the 
logistics business (e.g. transportation), labour intensive businesses (e.g. 
agriculture), and the hospitality, entertainment, services, and retail 
sector (e.g. menial work) (Finance Against Trafficking, 2014). Having 
said that, labour exploitation is virtually ubiquitous in the licit economy 
(ILO, 2014; Kara, 2011). Consequently, labour trafficking manifests itself 
in many different ways (Efrat, 2016).
By the same token, a number 
of business sectors are highly 
functional for the commis-
sion of human trafficking of-
fences. Generally speaking, 
the ties between the human 
trafficking business and the le-
gitimate market are wide-rang-
ing (Bravo, 2008; Parmentier, 
2010). This nexus between the 
shadow and legitimate econo-
my reflects a general trend of 
increasing proximity between 
organised crime operations 
and legal business structures 
(Savona & Riccardi, 2015; Van 
Duyne, 1993, 1993b). As for 
the purpose of this proximity, 
legitimate ventures provide the 
means for the fabrication of a 
legal façade (Aronowitz et al., 
2010). By definition, corporate 
structures are utilized more in labour trafficking than in sex trafficking 
operations2 (BE-E1). Tucking away criminal activities within a legal busi-
ness scheme by dint of opaque, non-transparent corporate structures 
and empty shell or fictitious companies is a common practice in the 
human trafficking industry (BE-E2; BE-E5; BE-E7; BE-E9; BE-E10). As a 
consequence, human trafficking operations routinely cut across the 
divide between upper world and underground economy, blending the 
boundary between legal and illegal ventures (Europol, 2015). As such, 
a strict distinction between mala fide and bona fide entrepreneurship 
is at variance with the brass tacks of the trafficking business (BE-E5). 
In addition to harbouring human trafficking activities, legal business 
structures facilitate various aspects of the criminal process, such as 
transportation and money laundering (Aronowitz et al., 2010; Finance 
Against Trafficking, 2014; Leman & Janssens, 2015).
2 Although there are legal establishments in which sexual and labour exploitation of women 
takes place simultaneously.
Таble 1. Number of iNitial recorded reports of traffickiNg iN humaN 
beiNgs iN belgium iN 2016 by ecoNomic sector
Source: Myria (2017).
Sector Number of reports
Hospitality/Horeca 9
Construction 5
Service stations 5
Retail 5
Domestic help 2
Cleaning services 1
Wholesale 1
Other 4
Total 32
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As follows, human trafficking operations mostly hide in plain sight or, in 
rare instances such as household service, are fully sequestered (Bravo, 
2008). The masking of exploitative practices, among other things, renders 
detecting and identifying human trafficking cases notoriously difficult 
(DSB, 2015; Kleemans & Smit, 2014). Seeing that human trafficking is 
a gravely underreported phenomenon (Goodey, 2008; Guia, 2015), any 
claims regarding the incidence of trafficking in human beings cannot be 
substantiated (Kopp, 2012; Parmentier, 2010; Weitzer, 2014a). Consequently, 
the figures presented hereafter are more suggestive of law enforcement 
activity than they reflect criminal activity (Kleemans & Smit, 2014; Levi et 
al., 2013). As Table 2 reveals, the number of human trafficking offences 
identified by Belgian police forces has steadily decreased over the last 
few years. About two thirds of these registered infractions relate to 
sexual exploitation, whereas labour exploitation makes up roughly one 
third of all recorded infringements. The UNODC (2016) has reported 
similar findings among registered victims. This is in stark contrast to the 
assertion made by Europol (2016) that a striking 90% of organised crime 
networks associated with human trafficking activities are involved in 
sexual exploitation. Accordingly, estimates regarding the type of human 
trafficking that is most prevalent are manifestly conflicting (Weitzer, 
2014a). As territory is of very little concern in the human trafficking 
business (BE-E4) (Kopp, 2012), the reports on human trafficking cases 
do not point to the presence of hotspots, with the exception of certain 
forms of prostitution (Levitt & Venkatesh, 2007; Mancuso, 2014). For 
instance, window prostitution is limited to certain areas (Adriaenssens et 
al., 2015), which can spark a power struggle between competing crime 
groups over those vice districts (BE-E11).
Таble 2. Number of traffickiNg iN humaN beiNgs iNfractioNs, orgaNized 
by type of exploitatioN iN belgium, 2012 – 2016
Source: Myria (2017).
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Sexual exploitation 466 586 460 467 396
Economic exploitation 321 273 166 160 168
Forced begging 44 33 38 33 13
Forced criminality 13 14 15 9 11
Organ harvesting 1 1 1 0 1
Total 845 907 680 669 589
Whereas the number of reported infractions has dwindled, Table 3 
shows that the number of convictions is clearly on the rise. In fact, 
Belgium has a relatively high number of convictions in comparison 
to other countries (DSB, 2015). Consistent with international findings 
(Eurostat, 2015; UNODC, 2016), one in five persons convicted of human 
trafficking offences in Belgium is a woman. The involvement of women 
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in the human trafficking trade is thus comparatively large (Kleemans & 
Smit, 2014). The gendered dimension of trafficking in human beings is 
particularly pervasive with respect to the victims of exploitation (Guia, 
2015; Hughes, 2014; Shelley, 2010), as illustrated by Table 4. In essence, 
the greater part of victims of sexual exploitation are female, whereas 
victims of labour exploitation are predominantly male (Eurostat, 2015). 
As regards sexual exploitation, the registered victims are scattered across 
different age categories. Labour exploitation, on the other hand, seems 
to affect an older target group. On the whole, minors appear to be an 
exception among registered victims (Eurostat, 2015).
Таble 3. Number of coNvictioNs for humaN traffickiNg offeNces 
iN belgium, orgaNized by geNder, 2009 – 2016
Source: DSB (2017).
Gender 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
Unknown 2 5 5 6 7 2 2 0
Male 111 75 76 71 59 59 63 37
Female 28 20 21 14 17 23 19 10
Total 141 100 102 91 83 84 84 47
Таble 4. Number of registered victims of humaN traffickiNg iN belgium, 
orgaNized by geNder, age aNd type of exploitatioN, 2013 – 2016
Source: Myria (2017).
Total
Sexual exploitation Labour exploitation Other exploitation Total
2013 2014 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2015
<18 4 1 5 4 0 1 3 2 0 3 6 0 4 5 14 6
18-25 15 19 22 23 19 18 9 9 0 1 1 2 34 38 32 34
26-30 8 12 7 7 13 26 6 13 0 0 0 3 21 38 13 23
>30 10 11 10 14 47 41 43 38 0 5 5 4 57 57 58 56
Total 37 43 44 48 79 86 61 62 0 9 12 9 116 138 117 119
Male 1 5 2 0 67 74 52 51 0 5 9 8 68 84 63 59
Female 36 38 42 48 12 12 9 11 0 4 3 1 48 54 54 60
Aside from a distinctive gender profile, human traffickers make for a 
diversified group in many other respects (Viukho, 2017). Perpetrators of 
human trafficking offences range from the very rich (BE-E2; BE-E8; BE-E10) 
down to the very poor (BE-E2; BE-E4; BE-E8). Strictly speaking, those who 
know their way around the sex trade (BE-E6) or any other implicated sector 
are in the capacity to take advantage of their pre-existing knowledge, 
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contacts, or even resources. A 
case in point is the involvement 
of business operators with a 
military, state security, or law 
enforcement background in 
human trafficking operations 
(BE-E13) (Leman & Janssens, 
2015; Shelley, 2010). Moving 
individuals from point A to point 
B in order to exploit them at 
their journey’s end is the sum 
and substance of any human 
trafficking operation (Efrat, 2016; 
Kleemans & Smit, 2014). As a 
result, the human trafficking 
business relies on people who 
are capable of bridging the 
gap between a certain country 
of origin and the country of 
destination (BE-E13) (Kleemans, 
2012). In essence, members of 
certain diaspora communities 
are in a position to capitalize on 
their transnational connections 
by means of human trafficking 
schemes (Arhin, 2016; Shelley, 
2010). Nationality is thus an important connecting thread in the 
phenomenon of trafficking in human beings. In this respect, Table 5 reveals 
a variegated picture of perpetrators of human trafficking. EU-nationals, 
by and large, make up the greater part of human trafficking offenders 
(Europol, 2016; Eurostat, 2015; Savona & Riccardi, 2015; UNODC, 2016; 
Walk Free Foundation, 2016). In addition, the main organised crime groups 
implicated in human trafficking activities are east European, Nigerian 
and Chinese networks (Europol, 2016; OSCE, 2013; Savona & Riccardi, 
2015). In sum, human traffickers are part of a remarkably heterogeneous 
whole (Aronowitz, 2009; Feingold, 2005). Attempting to delineate a profile 
would therefore negate the vast diversity of human trafficking operations 
(Weitzer, 2014a).
Much like the profile of human traffickers, the level of organisation 
in human trafficking operations varies widely (Aronowitz, 2001). 
Human trafficking rings are largely part of a continuum ranging from 
single perpetrators over loose, self-supporting networks to complex, 
multinational conglomerates (Aronowitz et al., 2010; Campana, 2015; 
Kleemans & Smit, 2014). As the logistics for trafficking in persons 
are fairly straightforward, there is no need for the instalment of a 
Таble 5. top 10 of the most importaNt NatioNalities of persoNs 
coNvicted for humaN traffickiNg offeNces iN belgium iN 2016
Source: Myria (2017).
Nationality Number of convicted persons
Belgium 37
Romania 11
Unknown/unregistered 8
Albania 8
Bulgaria 8
France 6
The Netherlands 6
China 5
Portugal 4
United Kingdom 3
Other 29
Total 125
2. MARKET STRUCTURE ANd SOCIAL ORGANISATION 
 OF TRAFFICKING NETwORKS
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colossal organised crime syndicate (BE-E15) (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 
2004; Tripp & McMahon-Howard, 2016). Alternatively, groups formed 
on an ad hoc basis (BE-E4) (Kopp, 2012), networks built on familial or 
clan ties (Europol, 2015; OSCE, 2013) (BE-C2; BE-C3) or even one-man 
operations (BE-C1) seem to get the job done without the encumbrance 
of a monolithic corporate structure. In essence, human trafficking 
operations are generally more organised in terms of their activities 
than they are organised in terms of structure (Leman & Janssens, 2008; 
Tripp & McMahon-Howard, 2016). Human trafficking operations can thus 
be surprisingly disorganised (Feingold, 2005). At any rate, less organised 
does not necessarily mean less serious (BE-E2; BE-E9; BE-E10). On the 
whole, human trafficking operations tend to be rather small scale. That 
is, exponentially increasing the volume of trafficked persons poses the 
network for the organisational challenge of effectively monitoring this 
mass of people. Consequently, economies of scale are practically non-
existent in the human trafficking business (Campana, 2015). Moreover, 
it is in the interest of criminal entrepreneurs to curb the number 
of associates who have compromising knowledge of the criminal 
undertaking as to keep the lid on the whole trafficking operation 
(Schloenhardt, 1999; Van Duyne et al., 2007). Not only are trafficking 
networks typically limited in size (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004; Kopp, 
2012), these organisations are further marked by their flexible structure 
(Aronowitz, 2001; Europol, 2016). The decentralized business structure 
of human trafficking groups reminds one, perhaps unsurprisingly, of the 
loosely tied business structure of human smuggling rings (BE-E5) (Europol, 
2016). This high degree of decentralization and flexibility allows for 
the continuous optimisation of their business model (BE-E13). By their 
very nature, human trafficking networks are learning organisations, able 
and willing to adapt their business to ever-changing circumstances 
(Aronowitz et al., 2010; Leman & Janssens, 2008). Those who fail to do 
so are inevitably headed for failure.
As mentioned before, the arrangement of relations between the different 
nodes of a human trafficking operation favours functionality over unduly 
complicated forms of organisation. Depending on the nationality and 
size of the group, some networks bear great resemblance to a pyramidal 
organisation structure (BE-E4; BE-E5). Human trafficking operations 
often incorporate a rudimental form of hierarchy, which is essentially a 
crystallization of any present division of roles (Aronowitz, 2001). Central to 
the human trafficking business structure is the creation of an intermediate 
level between the organizers and the victims of exploitation (BE-E10) 
(Leman & Janssens, 2015). In larger, multinational organisations, this 
principle takes the form of a management unit and smaller, specialised 
subunits (Aronowitz et al., 2010). Notwithstanding the wide variety of 
human trafficking operations and the wide variety of actors involved 
(Vermeulen et al., 2010), a number of roles seem to be inherent to 
the trafficking trade. At the top are the organisers or coordinators, who 
function as the brain of the human trafficking operation (BE-E4; BE-E5; 
BE-E10; BE-E12). Organizers are assisted by their right-hand men, also 
known as lieutenants (BE-E4) (Leman & Janssens, 2015). Business operators 
(Wheaton et al., 2010) tasked with the day-to-day management of human 
trafficking activities can fulfil a variety of functions, including the roles of 
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recruiter (BE-E7; BE-E10; BE-E11), transporter (BE-E6; BE-E7), and enforcer 
or supervisor (BE-E12; BE-E13). Women often play a special part in 
human trafficking schemes. One notable example is the role of dame de 
compagnie or big sister companion (BE-E1; BE-E5; BE-E7), who serves as 
an intermediary between the victim and the exploiter (Leman & Janssens, 
2015). Supplementary to the roles fulfilled by the core group, certain tasks 
that require specific knowledge or skills can be outsourced to service 
providers or facilitators (Leman & Janssens, 2008; Soudijn, 2014; Tijhuis, 
2006). Notable examples are accountants (BE-E1; BE-E3; BE-E5; BE-E11), 
employment agencies (BE-E1; BE-E13) (BE-C2), and professional money 
launderers (BE-E3; BE-E5).
As regards the workings of human trafficking operations, trafficking in 
persons unfolds itself as a cycle of actions rather than a single offence 
(Guia, 2015). The process of human trafficking spans the consecutive 
phases of recruitment, transportation, and exploitation (Aronowitz et al., 
2010; Salt & Stein, 1997). Before anything else, one needs to find people 
that are going to fuel the trafficking business (BE-E10; BE-10). To this end, 
a prospective workforce is round up, in most cases through traditional 
forms of recruitment (BE-E10) such as classified ads or word-of-mouth 
marketing (BE-E4; BE-E11; BE-E13). Recruitment almost always involves 
a certain level of deceit (Shelley, 2010). Most are recruited under false 
pretences (BE-E6; BE-E9; BE-E11), but in exceptional cases the victims 
are forced from the very beginning to go to Western Europe (BE-E6). 
For the recruitment to succeed, the recruiter should be someone who 
seems to inspire trust, possibly an acquaintance of the victim (Korsell 
et al., 2011; Shelley, 2010). Occasionally, the recruitment process can 
run in two directions, seeing that individuals who “view (…) prostitution 
as a logical option compared to other work alternatives” (García, 2016, 
p. 149) at times deliberately look for intermediaries or souteneurs in 
the interest of easing their debut into the sex trade (BE-C1). Once a 
person is won over by hook or by crook, the victim is transferred to 
the country of destination by any means conceivable (Shelley, 2010). 
Planes, trains, buses and cars are all recurrent forms of transportation 
(BE-E1; BE-E9; BE-E11). If possible, legal documents are used as not 
to arouse suspicion (BE-E1) (Kleemans & Smit, 2014). Intercontinental 
trafficking, on the contrary, often calls for smuggling practices (BE-E7; 
BE-E9). After arrival, the actual exploitation can take place. Victims are 
usually accommodated in small houses or flats (BE-E11), more often 
than not in substandard living conditions (BE-E1; BE-E9; BE-E10; BE-E13). 
Imposing some form of control and forcing victims into a position of 
utter dependency is central to the practice of exploitation (BE-E2; BE-E11; 
BE-E13). To this end, human traffickers frequently make use of the system 
of debt bondage. In essence, victims are coerced to repay large sums of 
money for their transportation, accommodation, and so on (BE-E5; BE-E7; 
BE-E9; BE-E11). After a while, the cycle repeats itself with new victims 
(BE-E1; BE-E11). Previous victims either get out, move up the criminal 
ladder or become an object of barter between the initial group and 
other trafficking networks (BE-E1; BE-E6). Human trafficking operations 
are principally characterised by rotation, dislocation, and a high rate 
of victim replacement (Europol, 2016; Kleemans & Smit, 2014). More 
sophisticated, transnational organisations are able to set up carousel 
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structures, which allow them to transfer victims from country to country 
(BE-E5; BE-E6; BE-E7).
For the most part, the archetypal equation of human trafficking with 
coerced prostitution or forced labour is somewhat misguided. At 
present, downright coercion seems to be the exception rather than the 
rule in trafficking operations (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014; García, 
2016; Guia, 2015). As it happens, keeping a crowd of resentful victims 
under one’s thumb is nothing short of a logistical nightmare (Zhang, 
2011). Conversely, by offering victims a win-win situation in the spirit 
of professionalisation (BE-E3; BE-E5; BE-E6) (Leman & Janssens, 2015), 
perpetrators avoid the major level of commitment intrinsic to extracting 
forced services. Lastly, the abuse of traditional cultural practices at one’s 
discretion is central to many international trafficking rings, notably in 
Albanian, Romanian, Nigerian, Chinese or even Indian circles (BE-E5; 
BE-E12) (Leman & Janssens, 2015).
Over and above this general method of operating, there are countless ways 
of carrying out human trafficking activities (OSCE, 2013). In the matter 
of sexual exploitation, two specific modi operandi are highlighted. First 
off, Nigerian networks are specialised in criminal exchange programmes 
or carousel setups (BE-E5) (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014). Nigerian 
human trafficking operations are by definition intercontinental. Victims 
are smuggled via the Libya route to Italy, where they are picked up and 
brought to Western Europe (BE-E5; BE-E6; BE-E7). The debt incurred by 
this journey can be as much as €60,000 per trafficked victim (BE-E5). In 
conjunction with debt bondage, victims are controlled through voodoo 
rituals and violence (BE-E5; BE-E7; BE-E12). Some victims manage to 
move up the ranks and assume the position of “madam” (BE-E5; BE-E7) 
(Europol, 2016). In this way, the system of exploitation preserves itself 
(BE-E7) (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014). The lover-boy method, on the 
other hand, revolves around emotional manipulation and the perversion 
of social relationships (Kleemans, 2012; OSCE, 2013). Lover-boys prey on 
vulnerable girls or women (BE-E5; BE-E12). In the case of respondent 
BE-C3, for example, teenage runaways from juvenile institutions were 
deliberately targeted (Myria, 2016). By means of an intense grooming 
process, the perpetrators isolate their victims, bind them to themselves 
and subsequently pressure them into doing sex work (BE-E12) (Federaal 
Migratiecentrum, 2014; OSCE, 2013). As regards labour trafficking, the 
workings of economic exploitation are quite diverse. The whole idea 
of labour trafficking is to keep labour costs at a minimum with a view 
to maximising profits (Kara, 2011; Wheaton et al., 2010). The posting of 
workers from low-wage in high-wage countries lends itself well to that 
purpose (Delepière et al., 2013), as it enables the entrepreneur to employ 
workers in the country of destination under the conditions of the country 
of origin (BE-E1; BE-E9). These types of secondment schemes or social 
dumping practices (BE-E9; BE-E10) are frequently accompanied by bogus 
self-employment ploys (BE-E2; BE-E5; BE-E7; BE-E9; BE-E13). By falsely 
declaring workers as self-employed, the enterprise is no longer bound by 
regular terms of employment (CGKRB, 2011) and, in turn, manages to evade 
certain social security contributions (BE-E2). Additionally, subcontracting 
arrangements, sometimes in the form of elaborate subcontracting cascades, 
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can be put into place as a way to distance the organiser from the actual 
exploitation (Delepière et al., 2013). Moreover, operating from within the 
framework of a legitimate corporate structure provides opportunities for 
coating exploitative practices with a veneer of legality (Leman & Janssens, 
2015). In order to sustain this pretence of legitimacy, entrepreneurs can 
for instance declare a minimal amount of work hours (BE-E4). In the 
same vein, victims of sexual exploitation working in bars or windows 
are sometimes registered under horeca contracts for tax purposes, yet 
worked hours and earnings are routinely under-declared (Boels, 2015; 
Weitzer, 2014b; Weitzer & Boels, 2015). Another avenue is to simply take 
advantage of legislative loopholes (BE-E5). On this point, perpetrators use 
the ambiguity of the legal framework on human trafficking for their own 
ends by deliberately framing the work of their victims in such a way that 
is possible to denounce the charge of human trafficking (Europol, 2017; 
Leman & Janssens, 2015). In this context, human trafficking for labour 
exploitation has more to do with structural labour market vulnerabilities 
than it bears upon the “aberrant criminal actions of deviant traffickers” 
(Davies, 2017; Shamir, 2012, p. 112).
That being said, trafficking in human beings often coincides with plenty 
of other transgressions. Depending on the modus operandi concerned, 
human trafficking operations regularly draw on a string of ancillary or 
instrumental offences (Vermeulen et al., 2010). Evidently, human trafficking 
and human smuggling activities can be very much interconnected 
(Kleemans & Smit, 2014). In order to move victims to where they are 
needed, some networks resort to the ticket of document forgery (Europol, 
2017) or corruption (BE-E5). One illustrative example is an elaborate 
human trafficking case involving Thai massage parlours. With the help of 
an employee of the Thai embassy in Brussels, the criminal organisation 
managed to obtain residence permits for all the girls. The staff member 
concerned charged no less than €6,000 per person for her services. 
As for the transportation of Thai girls, airport staff was bribed into 
turning a blind eye to their false documents (CGKRB, 2012). Parallel to 
transferring victims, the accommodation of victims quite often backslides 
to rack-renting practices (BE-E4; BE-E8; BE-E9; BE-E10). The extent to 
which organisations engage in criminal activities that do not add to the 
commission of the human trafficking offence, on the other hand, widely 
differs from profile to profile (BE-E5). In respect to other organised 
criminal activities, trafficking in human beings is often associated with 
drug trafficking (Dank et al., 2014). However, a connection to the drug 
trade can also be contributory to the commission of human trafficking, 
as drugging victims of sexual exploitation is a tried and tested method 
of inducing compliance (BE-E7; BE-E11) (Boels, 2015; Leman & Janssens, 
2015). In other instances, human trafficking is linked to other criminal 
activities by the use of victims in other criminal activities (Europol, 
2015), such as the case of Vietnamese labourers working on cannabis 
plantations (BE-E11). To all appearances, human trafficking operations 
verge on specialisation, as the perpetrators generally do not expand 
their criminal portfolio beyond their core business (BE-E1; BE-E10; BE-E13). 
Holding the reins over a human trafficking business is a time-consuming 
engagement that leaves little room for diversion. Moreover, having the 
means and opportunities to set up a human trafficking ring does not 
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necessarily mean that one also has access to alternative illicit trades 
(Kleemans, 2012).
It follows that interfaces between trafficking in human beings and other 
empirical manifestations of organised crime are far from systematic 
(BE-E1; BE-E12). To be accurate, some interconnections have in fact 
been uncovered, as in mutual connections between organised human 
trafficking rings (BE-E1; BE-E7; BE-E11), links with human smuggling rings 
(BE-E4) or links with the Chinese Triads (BE-E3) (Federaal Migratiecen-
trum, 2014) and motorcycle gangs (BE-E11) (Myria, 2017). Most of these 
relationships are based on either kinship and friendship (BE-E1) or on 
the principle of reciprocity (Tijhuis, 2006). The system of compensation 
between drug trafficking and human trafficking networks to launder 
money is a remarkable example of this type of symbiotic collusion (see 
section 3.4).
3.1. Source of capital for initiating/sustaining 
criminal operations
Much like the aforementioned cross-criminal collaborations, trafficking in 
human beings is firmly rooted in blatant opportunism. On the whole, 
the initial investments put into setting up human trafficking activities are 
minimal. As a matter of fact, criminal entrepreneurs deliberately search 
for ways to start up their business with as little capital as possible (BE-E3). 
In actuality, very little is needed to set up a human trafficking business, 
though this can depend on the particular method of operation. Concerning 
the business model of lover-boys, no launch capital whatsoever is needed 
(BE-E5). In entering the human trafficking business, having the necessary 
knowledge and the right connections takes precedence over sitting on a 
sizable reserve of money (BE-E4; BE-E6; BE-C3).
As law enforcement agencies rarely trouble themselves over the question 
of start-up capital (BE-E5; BE-E7; BE-E13), not much is known about 
the source of financing. In view of the fact that one can get a human 
trafficking operation off the ground with limited funds, own resources 
are a major source of financing (BE-E10). A case in point are former 
victims, who use the little money they have earned to set up their 
own business (BE-E4). Additionally, human trafficking operations can be 
funded by pooling resources together (BE-E3; BE-E4) or by turning to 
relatives (BE-E3). To illustrate, respondent BE-C2 claimed that €5,000 
was all it took to establish his car wash venture, a sum which he easily 
secured by taking out a business loan.
By the same token, keeping a human trafficking business up and 
running in the face of critical moments is more of a challenge than 
launching said operation. Pivotal moments, such as apprehension by 
law enforcement authorities, put the offenders in what is essentially 
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a sink-or-swim situation. One way of dealing with this adversity is by 
maintaining control over victims in one way or another, even from 
behind bars (BE-E6; BE-E12). Victims who willingly bear the litigation 
expenses of their alleged exploiters are a grim example of this type 
of boundless manipulation (BE-E12). Related to this survival strategy, 
respondent BE-C2’s family members willingly stepped in to take care of 
business while he served his prison sentence, thus ensuring the continuity 
of his undertaking. Yet, in preference to responding to crises, criminal 
entrepreneurs principally act in advance of law enforcement interventions. 
To this end, human traffickers have a whole range of counterstrategies 
at their disposal. If push comes to shove, human trafficking operations 
are quite easily uprooted and relocated elsewhere (BE-E1; BE-E5; BE-E6; 
BE-E7). In lieu of dislodging their entire operation, human trafficking 
organisations usually opt for moving their criminal assets as far as 
possible from the spot where the exploitation takes place (FATF & 
MENAFATF, 2015; Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014; Kopp, 2012). In order 
to mitigate the risk of losing everything, criminal proceeds should be 
translocated as soon as possible (BE-E4; BE-E5). Considering the deep-
seated familial and international dimension of human trafficking, it is 
not uncommon to hide one’s revenues with relatives (BE-E1; Dank et 
al., 2014), both in the country of origin and in third countries (BE-E5). 
Spreading the risk of confiscation (Aronowitz et al., 2010), for instance 
through various investments abroad (BE-E10), also occurs. In addition 
to hauling the proceeds a long way from their illicit origins, corporate 
structures embroiled in human trafficking activities have recourse to 
bankruptcy abuse and fraud (BE-E10) (Leman & Janssens, 2015). In this 
sense, implicated companies are suddenly insolvent on the occasion of 
a conviction (BE-E5; BE-E7). Furthermore, criminal entrepreneurs often 
go to great lengths to avoid leaving incriminating trails (BE-E5; BE-E13; 
Aronowitz et al., 2010), to which end various strategies are suitable. 
Straw men schemes (BE-E5), using the internet to sidestep wiretapping or 
even adopting nicknames (BE-E9) all answer this purpose.
On account of the fact that hardly any start-up capital is needed, 
it follows that human trafficking operations do rebound after critical 
episodes (BE-E4; BE-E12). However, this low market entry threshold 
also means that competitors eager to fill the market void are abundant 
(BE-E1; Leman & Janssens, 2015). In case of such a criminal coup d’état, 
the complete lack of territoriality in the human trafficking business 
means that the opportunities to reinstate one’s business elsewhere 
are abundant (BE-E4). Whereas some organisations inevitably crumble, 
others manage to pull through. Consequently, the latter category 
is in a position to learn from its mistakes and adapt accordingly 
(BE-E5). Moreover, because of the rather modest initial investment, 
stripping a human trafficking networks of its assets is not enough to 
permanently incapacitate the operation (BE-E4). On the contrary, a 
convicted human trafficker is still endowed with relevant experience 
and the right connections. A loss of reserves or revenue might not 
leave one much choice but to simply take up where one previously 
left off (Naylor, 1999).
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3.2. Settlement of payments
Aside from the occasional moment of crisis, human trafficking organisations 
have to deal with the everyday issue of working out a payment system. 
As concerns sexual exploitation, the sex trade is conventionally a cash-
up-front business (BE-E1; Europol Financial Intelligence Group, 2015; 
Finance Against Trafficking, 2014; Korsell et al., 2011). Besides cash 
transactions, only a few venues accept credit card payments (BE-E1; 
BE-E13). Most often, the client pays to an intermediary who is present 
at the spot (Petrunov, 2011), such as a “big sister” companion (BE-E5; 
Leman & Janssens, 2015) or the local manager of the venue. Alternatively, 
the customer pays directly to the victim (BE-E1; BE-E7), who either 
immediately hands over the payment to the intermediary (BE-E11) or, 
more infrequently, compliantly brings the earnings to the exploiters 
(BE-E1; BE-E6; BE-E12; BE-E13). These types of settlements permit the 
criminal organisation to sever the cash flow from their commodity, in 
this case trafficked human beings (Kopp, 2012). As a matter of course, 
the organiser of the human trafficking operation sees to the redistribution 
of the takings among the different ranks of the organisation (BE-E11). 
Ordinarily, this allotment involves a fifty-fifty arrangement between the 
victim and the exploiter. However, one should bear in mind that all 
expenses are subtracted from the victim’s share (BE-E1; BE-E11; Leman & 
Janssens, 2015).
As for labour exploitation, a different pattern emerges. As a rule, the 
customer pays the employer for the work that has been done. The 
method of payment is largely subject to the sector of operation (BE-E1; 
BE-E4; BE-E11). Bank transfers are a common payment system in a number 
of businesses, whereas other undertakings such as carwashes are primarily 
cash-based. Wire transfers are usually quickly followed by a withdrawal 
in cash (BE-E4; Delepière et al., 2013). The employer gives money to the 
intermediary, who in turn pays the workers (BE-E1). For the most part, 
workers are paid in cash (BE-E3; BE-E4; BE-E12; Delepière et al., 2013). 
Again, all incurred expenses are deducted from the victims’ wages (BE-E11). 
In essence, the exploiter receives the payments and subsequently handles 
the apportionment of the organisation’s revenues (BE-E11).
Incidentally, control is of critical importance in ensuring payments from 
victims (BE-E5; BE-E13; Campana, 2015). Moreover, it is in the interest 
of the exploiter to have a clear picture of the earnings of his or her 
victims (BE-E13). To that end, the ways and means to keep a tight rein 
on trafficked victims are virtually limitless. As a matter of usual practice, 
victims are forced into a position of financial dependence (BE-E11). 
The system of debt bondage, as pointed out before, compels people 
to work off their debt burden (BE-E1; BE-E5; BE-E12). Accumulating 
wage arrears or withholding money further (BE-E2) binds the victim 
to the trafficking network, for fear of suffering the loss of these due 
payments. Likewise, exploiters sometimes hold on to the victims’ first 
earnings as a sort of security deposit (BE-E11). In distinction to keeping 
back victims’ payments, some human trafficking operations implement 
a crude penalty system, basically imposing a fine on all types of minor 
transgressions (BE-E1; BE-E10). Another aspect of control is restricting 
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and supervising every movement of trafficking victims. Isolating or even 
sequestrating workers principally corresponds to this need (BE-E1; BE-E7; 
BE-E9; BE-E11). Under other conditions, human trafficking networks make 
use of technological developments such as cameras (BE-E1; BE-E13), 
mobile phones (BE-E5; BE-E6; BE-E7) or tachographs in lorries (BE-E10) 
in conjunction with ”low-tech” surveillance in the form of on-the-spot 
supervisors (BE-E13). By taking away identity papers (BE-E6; BE-E11) or 
abusing the person’s illegal status (BE-E4; BE-E10; BE-E12) exploiters 
effectively limit their victim’s freedom of movement to the confines of 
the human trafficking operation.
In the case of a sham marriage (BE-E1) or domestic servitude, one’s 
mobility rarely extends beyond the front door. Alongside physical 
restraints, psychological terror is a favoured method of control. In this 
respect, branding victims by means of tattoos (BE-E1; BE-E6) or outright 
mutilation (BE-E9) conveys an unequivocal message. On the subject of 
instilling fear, violence or threats thereof towards both the victim and his 
or her relatives are ever-present (BE-E1; BE-E7; BE-E9). Or rather, violence 
is not as common as more subtle means of control such as extortion, as 
the use of violence implies less profit and harsher punishment (Englund 
et al., 2008; Leman & Janssens, 2008; Vermeulen et al., 2007).
3.3. Costs of doing business
By its very nature, trafficking in human beings is a cost-saving exercise 
(BE-E3; BE-E4; BE-E5). From a business point of view, human trafficking 
makes for a relatively inexpensive undertaking considering that a trafficked 
individual is a remarkably low-cost ”commodity” (Europol, 2015; Wheaton 
et al., 2010). As one would expect, the operating costs of a human 
trafficking organisation vary widely according to the network’s method 
of operation (BE-E5). Ultimately, exploiters recoup any costs or expenses 
incurred during the operation directly from their victims (BE-E4; BE-E9; 
BE-E10; BE-E11).
Each stage in the process of human trafficking entails different costs. 
Before anything else, exploitation requires people. Getting a hold of 
those people mainly involves advertisement costs (BE-E1; Portnoff et 
al., 2017). Accordingly, the costs of recruitment are in effect next to 
nothing (Leman & Janssens, 2008). After ensnaring one or several victims, 
the prospective labour force needs to be transferred to their country 
of destination. Evidently, the cost of transportation is commensurate 
with the distance that is covered by the operation. As far as trafficking 
within Europe is concerned, transportation costs generally consist of 
plane, train, or bus fees (BE-E1; BE-E11) or, as an alternative, the price 
of a second-hand car or mini-van and fuel (BE-E1), as well as obtaining 
travel documents, whether counterfeit or not (BE-E3; BE-E13). So, in 
spite of appearance, transporting victims is generally a minimal cost of 
doing business (Kara, 2011). On the contrary, the expenditure item of 
transportation is conveniently turned into a source of profit. By way of 
illustration, a trip from Eastern Europe usually costs about €40 or roughly 
the price of low-budget flight (BE-E1; BE-E11). Victims, on the other 
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hand, are ordered to repay the traffickers upwards of €800 for their 
travel expenses (BE-E11). The same goes for human trafficking operations 
involving long-distance smuggling. Trafficked individuals incur a debt of 
€15,000, €30,000, or even €60,000 (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014), 
a sum that is eagerly inflated in light of perceived risks of traversing 
borders but is in no way proportional to the real costs of transportation 
(BE-E5; BE-E9; BE-E11). Hence, the system of debt bondage or coerced 
indebtedness is a patently overblown contract (Kara, 2011).
Next, as concerns the accommodation of victims, networks frequently 
pay around €800 in monthly rent for a small house or apartment (BE-E1; 
BE-E11). In order to secure a lease agreement, human traffickers often 
turn to their web of contacts (Korsell et al., 2011). In preference to 
paying rent, in exceptional cases the cost of accommodation is avoided 
altogether by housing labourers in their respective workplace (BE-E10; 
BE-E16). Contrarily, accommodation is a cost item that is increasingly 
remodelled into a money-spinning scheme through the practice of rack-
renting (BE-E10). If the monthly rent is €800, the exploiter simply 
harbours five to ten victims in the same place and charges each of them 
a fee of roughly €250 (BE-E11).
Furthermore, exploitation necessitates a certain infrastructure, such 
as a workplace, working clothes and all kinds of implements (BE-C2; 
BE-E1; BE-E13; Adriaenssens et al., 2015). Setting up basic organisational 
structures can be a substantial investment. It would, therefore, be 
worthwhile to look into such cases from a money laundering angle. 
On the other hand, if the infrastructure is pre-existent to the human 
trafficking activities, as is often the case with labour exploitation (BE-
E4), then no investment whatsoever is required. In addition to the 
infrastructure of trafficking in human beings, criminal organisations 
are confronted with a number of operating expenses. These costs 
are primarily connected to the everyday management of a trafficking 
venture. Mobile communication and internet access are, of course, 
rather unexceptional business expenses (BE-E1; BE-E7). A more atypical 
cost item is the repatriation of criminal assets (Soudijn & Reuter, 2016), 
as for instance money transfer services charge a ten percent commission 
on transactions (BE-E13) (Brenig et al., 2015).
Other costs related to exploitation include the rent for windows, which 
is specific to red light districts3 (BE-E1; BE-E5) (Adriaenssens et al., 
2015). Window fees normally fluctuate between €100 and €200 per 
shift (Adriaenssens et al., 2015; Boels, 2016), though there are large 
regional differences (BE-E6; BE-E12; BE-E13). Advertising sexual services 
on-line is typically free of charge. Bumping these ads in order to draw 
in more customers, on the other hand, requires payment, for instance 
via text message (BE-E6) (Portnoff et al., 2017). As for wage costs, since 
3 While on the subject of renting windows for sex work, the means of gaining access to these 
venues, incidental to the involvement of third parties in window prostitution, vary from place 
to place. As Weitzer and Boels (2015, p. 252) note: “In Antwerp, the sex workers rent window 
space directly from a building owner. In Brussels, madams rent a window unit from the building 
owner and supervise the prostitutes who work for them. In Ghent, prostitution café managers/
barkeepers rent space from the building owner, and sex workers typically enter into written 
contracts with managers in order to occupy the space for a specific period of time.”
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trafficked workers are axiomatically paid well below the legal minima, 
labour exploitation represents an immense saving in labour costs. 
Labour trafficking implies a saving of at least fifty percent, and in the 
worst case this cost-item is eliminated altogether (BE-E2; BE-E4; BE-E9; 
BE-E10). Lastly, control has an evident decisive relevance to the matter 
of exploitation. Monitoring or control-related costs are considerable, as 
keeping people in check takes a lot of time and resources (Campana, 
2015; Korsell et al., 2011).
3.4. Profits and profit sharing
Proceeding from this low-cost business model perspective, trafficking 
in human beings is often believed to generate immense profits. On 
average, the overall revenues of a human trafficking operation easily 
add up to several tens or even hundreds of thousands of euros (BE-E2; 
BE-E5; BE-E12; BE-E14), not to mention the outliers who rake up millions 
of euros in profit (BE-E1; BE-E10). Throughout the human trafficking 
business, profits are subject to large fluctuations (Englund et al., 2008; 
OSCE, 2013). As a matter of course, trafficking in persons involves 
services that are provided on a continuous basis. Subsequently, the 
proceeds of human trafficking are patterned by a steady flow of 
relatively small takings (FinCen, 2014; Korsell et al., 2011). Weighed 
against the nominal investment required to get a human trafficking 
operation up and running, trafficking in human beings yields a quick 
and considerable profit (Kara, 2011; Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010; 
Petrunov, 2011). In point of fact, a criminal entrepreneur can normally 
regain his initial investments in a matter of days (Leman & Janssens, 
2015). Trafficking in persons is nevertheless far from the limitless source 
of profit it is commonly made out to be (Campana, 2015; Marcus et 
al., 2016). On the whole, human trafficking seems to be less profitable 
than other criminal undertakings, such as drug trafficking (Bruinsma & 
Bernasco, 2004; Levi & Reuter, 2006). Adding to that, the relative 
absence of economies of scale significantly limits the profit potential 
(Campana, 2015).
Trafficking in persons can be financially rewarding in several different 
ways. That is, exploiters either extort services from their victims or 
trade in trafficked persons (Bravo, 2008; OSCE, 2013). The latter option 
appears to be more and more exceptional nowadays (BE-E5; Leman & 
Janssens, 2008), as renting out or selling individuals is less lucrative 
than exploiting them over a longer period of time (Leman & Janssens, 
2015). Deducting travel and living expenses, imposing fines, and wielding 
extortionate interest rates (Kara, 2011) increases the margin of profit 
as well. Concerning sexual exploitation, estimates on the proceeds 
vary considerably. One victim is reckoned to yield somewhere in the 
ballpark of €2,000 to €8,000 a week (BE-E1; BE-E6; BE-E11; Boels, 2015; 
Roudaut, 2011). Similarly, the number of trafficked persons stretches 
from a single individual (BE-E13) up to dozens of victims (BE-E5). In order 
to keep the operation at a manageable scale, the number of victims rarely 
exceeds that of a handful (BE-E1). The estimated number of clients for 
window workers clusters around five a day, give or take a few (BE-E6; 
Financing oF traFFicking in human beings in belgium 145
BE-E7; BE-E11), though sex workers can expand their clientele by engaging 
in other prostitution segments such as internet-based or private services 
(BE-E6). As for the price range of sexual services, rates are mainly 
contingent on the type of prostitution (BE-E6; BE-E7; BE-E12). The average 
price for window prostitution is €50 (BE-E6; Boels, 2015), whereas escort 
services are usually paid €150 (BE-E1; BE-E6). On the whole, sex workers 
charge somewhere around €50 to €100 for their services (Adriaenssens et 
al., 2015; Boels, 2015). Victims of human trafficking, however, are prone 
to working at a cut-rate as they are in no position to refuse clients 
(BE-E6; BE-E12). Specifically, victims oftentimes procure services below 
the standard rate in order to meet revenue quotas imposed by their 
exploiters (Boels, 2015). In this connection, sex workers who have no 
say in their working conditions also have little control over the number 
of clients they receive (García, 2016), let alone the prices they charge. 
Offering services at a cut-price nonetheless affects the market for sex 
work and, as a consequence, creates tensions with other prostitutes 
(Boels, 2015). With reference to economic exploitation, the term profit 
takes on various meanings. By way of explanation, profits can be 
regarded as all direct gains from human trafficking activities. Contrarily, 
the profit can also be equated to all wages, social contributions, and 
other expenses that have been evaded in the process (BE-E9; BE-E11). In 
other words, the issue of sizing up profit in labour trafficking is rather 
muddled. The proceeds of labour trafficking largely depend on the 
duration and gravity of the exploitative practices (BE-E2). Moreover, low 
labour costs increase profits as they allow for more competitive pricing 
(BE-E4; BE-E11).
When it comes to divvying up the proceeds, shares are generally in 
accordance with the respective contribution of that member to the 
human trafficking operation (BE-E1; BE-E4; Petrunov, 2011). As mentioned 
earlier, the organiser is the one who is responsible for the redistribution 
of profits. This apportionment is seemingly reflective of the hierarchy 
present in a criminal organisation, provided that a certain degree of 
organisation is in fact existent in the trafficking operation. Principally, the 
organiser takes the lion’s share of the profit, his lieutenants get a smaller 
piece of the pie, and so on (BE-E4; BE-E11). Interestingly, respondent 
BE-C3, as a more peripheral member of the operation, considered going 
out with the girls along with casual sexual encounters to be a form 
of payment in kind. In fact, he declared that he had no real financial 
motive to take part in these activities because he was already employed 
on a full time basis somewhere else and, in consequence, did not view 
the pin money he received for his services as the group’s driver as the 
main perquisite of this job. On the occasion that trafficking networks 
externalize some of their activities, service providers or brokers are paid 
on a freelance basis (Leman & Janssens, 2008). As one might imagine, 
the trafficked workers are quite literally at the bottom of the “food 
chain.”
By and large, offending and spending are closely connected. The greater 
part of criminal proceeds is blown on luxury goods as to keep up a 
lavish lifestyle (CGKRB, 2012). Prodigal spending sprees and conspicuous 
wealth are, of course, flagrant measures of the economic power one has 
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managed to accumulate (Petrunov, 2011). Remaining assets, if any, are 
usually invested (FATF, 2011; Kopp, 2012; Korsell et al., 2011; Leman & 
Janssens, 2015; Petrunov, 2011). Investments are predominantly made in 
the real estate sector, both domestically and in other countries (BE-E3; 
BE-E7; BE-E12). In turn, investments mostly involve legal opportunities. 
Respondent BE-C2, for one, dipped into the proceeds of his car 
wash business to set up two supplementary convenience stores. The 
revenues from human trafficking operations, however, can also be used 
to embark upon other criminal enterprises, such as drug trafficking 
(BE-E4). Depending on the profile and background of the offender, 
investments can take place in Belgium as well as abroad (BE-E4; BE-E7; 
BE-E8; BE-E10). Investment choices are thus marked by their notable 
proximity to the criminal entrepreneur. In general, investments stay close 
to home (Kruisbergen et al., 2015; Levi & Reuter, 2006). Lastly, part of 
the profits flows right back into the trafficking business with a view to 
sustaining subsequent cycles of operation (BE-E1; BE-E9; BE-E11; BE-E13) 
or, on rare occasions, to increase the scale of the illicit undertaking 
(BE-E1; BE-E11).
In a related manner, investing abroad points to the cross-border move-
ment of human trafficking proceeds. As mentioned before, offenders 
primarily send criminal proceeds to their country of origin (Europol, 
2016; Europol Financial Intelligence Group, 2015) in a bid to safeguard 
their financial assets. Transferring illicit earnings on a regular basis would 
be a sensible strategy (Korsell et al., 2011), as letting large sums of 
money accumulate in the country of operation runs the risk of losing 
the full amount of criminal proceedings at the hand of law enforcement 
interventions. The physical transportation of cash by cash couriers is a 
prevalent way of moving assets abroad which, perhaps, could be expected 
given the finding that trafficking in human beings, for a great part, is 
a cash-based economy (BE-E5; BE-E12; Europol, 2015). An illustrative 
example is the case of the white van courier, who was assigned the 
task of collecting the sex trafficking scene’s filthy lucre along a set 
route, crossing Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany before delivering 
the stacks of cash to Bulgaria. The cash courier did not only move 
human trafficking profits in exchange for a certain commission fee, but 
worked for the entire Bulgarian criminal circuit in Western Europe (BE-E5; 
Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014). Secondly, wire transfers are increasingly 
avoided as a cross-border conduit for criminal assets on account of their 
traceability (BE-E6; Europol, 2015; Petrunov, 2011). On the off-chance that 
bank transfers are being used, this is usually realised by breaking down 
the funds into smaller transactions, by wiring money through third-party 
bank accounts, by having victims transfer the assets (BE-E1) or through the 
medium of money mules (BE-E4). Outside the traditional banking system, 
money service businesses such as Western Union, MoneyGram and 
Moneytrans are frequently used by non-Belgian offenders to repatriate 
profits (BE-E1; BE-E3; BE-E15). Yet again, these financial transactions are 
carried out under a different name with the aim of bypassing any active 
identification systems (BE-E5; BE-E13; Leman & Janssens, 2015). On the 
subject of underground banking, hawala money transfers are restricted to 
certain nationalities (BE-E1; BE-E5; BE-E10; Europol, 2015), such as Afghani 
and Pakistani ethnic groups (Soudijn, 2015). Similar to the method of 
Financing oF traFFicking in human beings in belgium 147
hawala banking is the Black Western Union system specific to Nigerian 
networks (BE-E5). In essence, criminal assets are send to Nigeria by 
means of parallel money transfers run through grocery stores or other 
retailers (Federaal Migratiecentrum, 2014).
Transferring profits and subsequently reinserting criminal capital in the 
regular circuit can be considered as the most prominent method of 
money laundering in human trafficking operations (BE-E4; BE-E5; BE-E12; 
BE-E13) (FATF, 2011). It stands to reason that this method is a rampant 
approach to criminal money management as it is a very easy way 
to integrate illicit funds into the legal economy (Europol Financial 
Intelligence Group, 2015). However, the laundering of trafficking profits 
does not necessarily follow the same fixed pattern. Rather, offenders 
launder their illicit profits by any means possible (BE-E13), for example 
through purchasing alcohol cheaply and reselling it at inflated prices 
(BE-E4). In as much as human trafficking operations are principally 
clandestine enterprises (Weitzer, 2014a), the incidence of money 
laundering is largely uncharted territory. However, the figures presented 
by the Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (FIU) are, to a 
certain degree, indicative of the scale of this issue. Between 2010 and 
2015, a total of 866 cases of money laundering connected to human 
trafficking activities were reported to the public prosecutor’s office 
(CTIF-CFI, 2015). As Table 6 reveals, substantial amounts of money are 
involved.
The bottom line of any money 
laundering scheme is to provide 
criminal proceeds with a legal 
façade (BE-E14; Levi & Reuter, 
2006). As explained above, hu-
man trafficking operations, and 
labour trafficking operations in 
particular, routinely take advan-
tage of legitimate companies. 
For this reason, trafficking in 
persons lends itself particu-
larly well to money laundering 
(Delepière et al., 2013; Europol, 
2015; Levi, 2015). Provided that 
a human trafficking network operates within a bona fide business struc-
ture, the comingling of legitimate and illegitimate assets is inherent to 
the workings of the criminal enterprise (BE-E1; BE-E14; Europol Financial 
Intelligence Group, 2015). As a further laundering procedure, corporate 
structures easily allow for trade-based money laundering (BE-E3; BE-E5), 
for instance through invoice fraud (BE-E4; BE-E7; BE-E10) or bogus con-
sultancy fees (BE-E10). A striking example is the compensation system 
between drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings. Essentially, 
human trafficking organisations need hard cash to pay their workers, 
whereas drug traffickers need to get rid of their cash supplies. This 
cross-criminal exchange between two front companies is subsequently 
covered by false invoices (BE-E3; BE-E15; CTIF-CFI, 2016). More generally, 
profits are passed from one transit bank account to another (BE-E9). Not 
Таble 6. scale of files liNked to traffickiNg iN humaN beiNgs 
aNd forwarded to judicial authorities by the belgiaN fiu 
(2014 – 2016)
Source: CTIF-CFI (2016).
Year Number of files Total (€ million)
2014 29 17.69
2015 17 13.22
2016 20 14.63
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only are obfuscated business structures consisting of many interconnect-
ing firms conducive to the harbouring of trafficking activities, they also 
enable offenders to let the proceedings circle between several accounts 
of their own companies. Similarly, chains of subcontractors can double 
as pipelines for criminal assets (BE-E4). Alternatively, the accounts of 
victims or money mules are put to use as transit bank accounts (BE-
E13; BE-E14). After passing the proceeds around, the rule of thumb is 
to break the paper trail by turning the profits into cash, often through 
smurfing techniques4 (BE-E3; BE-E4; BE-E15; CTIF-CFI, 2016; Delepière 
et al., 2013). As a consequence, the last steps of the money laundering 
process take effect outside the regular banking system (Delepière et al., 
2013; Shelley, 2010). Overall, money laundering schemes tied to human 
trafficking operations rarely get more complex than this (Petrunov, 2011). 
In fact, the methods by which human traffickers launder their earnings 
are markedly similar to those used for other criminal activities (CGKRB, 
2011; OSCE, 2014).
3.5. The role and impact of the internet 
on human trafficking activities and finances
Likewise, the internet and accompanying technological advancements 
constitute powerful drivers for all manner of illicit trades (Europol, 2017; 
Lavorgna, 2015). As regards trafficking in human beings, the Internet 
fulfils three main functions (Myria, 2017). First off, online classified 
ads, social networking sites, and dating sites all serve as recruitment 
hubs for trafficking victims (Hughes, 2014; Latonero, 2011; Myria, 
2017). Next, the Internet is of great use to the management of human 
trafficking rings (BE-E5) (Myria, 2017), as it facilitates communication 
(BE-E1; BE-E10; BE-E13) and capacitates organisers to coordinate 
trafficking activities from a distance (BE-E10). Moreover, concerning 
the management of victims in particular, recent technologies have 
significantly expanded the arsenal of methods of control (BE-E1; BE-E5; 
BE-E7), for instance through so-called sextortion practices (Di Nicola et 
al., 2017; Lavorgna, 2015) or by remotely monitoring trafficked persons 
(Hughes, 2014). Lastly, sex trafficking victims are increasingly advertised 
online (Korsell et al., 2011; Myria, 2017).
Hitherto, the use of digital communication technologies has been 
reported more for sexual exploitation than for cases of labour trafficking 
(Hughes, 2014; Latonero, 2011). It appears that more traditional methods 
of recruitment are preferred for select target audiences, such as 
labourers who are located in rural areas (Latonero, 2011). The internet 
has nevertheless left its mark on the recruitment process of human 
traffickers. Above all, ICTs lower the threshold for making contact with 
4 By way of explanation: “One of the ways that criminals can overcome some of the transaction 
regulation is by using external allies to circumvent restrictions on deposit amounts or add 
confusion to the financial trail. The classic method is to take a large cash sum, for example 
100,000, and to break this down into smaller sums of between 8,000 and 9,000. A number of 
members of the gang or outside members such as family or friends are given batches of the 
money and ordered to deposit it from different banks locally to arrive at the same destination 
bank. This process is known as smurfing and it was devised to avoid detection when large 
sums of cash needed to be deposited” (Naheem, 2015, p. 518).
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potential victims (BE-E1; BE-E17; Myria, 2017). In this regard, detailed 
social networking profiles provide the means for victim selection, social 
engineering, and tailored deceit (Lavorgna, 2015; Myria, 2017; Watson 
et al., 2015). Correspondingly, a calculated employment of ICTs can 
potentially replace the position of recruiter or transporter abroad in 
specific cases, notably one-to-one exploitation and sham marriages 
(BE-E4; BE-E7). Hence, social media and other technologies present an 
unparalleled opportunity for individual traffickers to set up their own 
operation (Tripp & McMahon-Howard, 2016). Furthermore, technological 
developments have left a marked impact on the working conditions 
and areas of activity of sex work in general (García, 2016). After all, 
online classified ads and specialised websites provide a relatively covert 
and discrete way of advertising sexual services and accessing clients 
compared to the alternative of publicly displaying prostitutes in red 
light districts (BE-E11). Sex trafficking networks have accordingly shifted 
their main fields of operation from bars and windows to private and 
clandestine soliciting (BE-E4; BE-E11; Di Nicola et al., 2017). Against this 
background, the present surge of private forms of prostitution in the 
wake of the ongoing digital revolution is something of a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, web-based soliciting grants sex workers a 
certain level of freedom, independence, and concealment from the 
public view. From the opposed point of view, this clandestineness could 
lead to precarious situations (García, 2016). For example, the presence 
of police officers in Belgian vice districts serves as a tool to enhance 
social control (Weitzer, 2014b). Yet, when sexual encounters take place 
in apartments or disreputable hotel rooms, this type of external oversight 
is virtually absent. On top of promoting anonymity, new communication 
technologies have drastically cut the transaction costs of private prostitution 
and escort services, in particular by cutting back the expenditure on 
accommodation (Adriaenssens et al., 2015). Conversely, the impact of 
cryptocurrencies on the human trafficking business model has been far 
less extensive (BE-E3; Europol, 2015). As bearer negotiable instruments, 
decentralised and encrypted virtual currencies such as bitcoin can be 
regarded as perfectly legal facilitators of money laundering (BE-E14; 
Brenig et al., 2015). What has kept this inexpensive system of transferring 
from taking off, is the limited acceptability of cryptocurrencies and the 
fact that cashing outside the system is still a problem (Brenig et al., 2015). 
Cryptocurrencies nevertheless embody an insidious trend in managing 
criminal finances (BE-E14). Law enforcement agencies should therefore be 
alert to the possibility of recent technological advancements gaining a 
firmer foothold in the human trafficking business model.
Notwithstanding the glaring advantages set out above, the use of internet 
and assorted technologies bears a number of drawbacks for human 
trafficking organisations. As the online outposts of human trafficking 
activities form a rare instance where criminal operations do actually 
surface, websites such as redlights.be (BE-E5; BE-E6) or backpage.com 
(Portnoff et al., 2017) provide an interesting avenue to identify human 
trafficking cases (Di Nicola et al., 2017; Latonero, 2011; Myria, 2017; 
Watson et al., 2015). By and of itself, online classified ads selling sex 
are rife with potentially inculpatory information (Portnoff et al., 2017). 
Tracing back these ads to the exploiters behind them constitutes a major 
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step in countering human trafficking for sexual exploitation and, more 
importantly, this same alertness is gradually seeping through the law 
enforcement spectrum (BE-E5; BE-E6; Myria, 2017). Additionally, websites 
where clients discuss the sex workers they have visited can be used to 
single out trafficking cases (Adriaenssens et al., 2015; Korsell et al., 2011). 
Moreover, through the use of digital communication technologies, all 
kinds of transactions and communications are registered (Hughes, 2014). 
Antithetically to the deceptive opportunities of the internet, websites (e.g. 
Etransport.pl) where truck drivers exchange experiences and information 
about their employers enable potential victims to warn each other for 
trafficking practices (BE-E10; Myria, 2017).
Going from “digital smoke signals” (Latonero, 2011, p. 37) to the financial 
footprints of human trafficking offences, financial investigations are widely 
regarded as an essential tool of an effective response to the criminal 
threat of trafficking in persons. In Belgium, financial investigations can be 
categorised as either minimal or maximal (BE-E1). Financial investigations 
adhering to the minimal approach are essentially a matter of calculating 
or tracing criminally obtained assets with a view to confiscation (BE-
E2; BE-E4; BE-E10; BE-E11). In this sense, minimal financial investigations 
are quasi standard practice in human trafficking cases (BE-E1; BE-E6; 
BE-E12; BE-E13). More profound financial investigations that go beyond 
the purpose of sheer confiscation, on the contrary, are relatively 
infrequent and seem to be limited to bigger cases (BE-E1; BE-E7; BE-
E8). Whichever option is deemed suitable in a concrete case is at the 
consideration of the prosecutor’s office (BE-E1; BE-E4). In spite of this 
fractional application, profound financial investigations are paramount 
to laying bare the structure of trafficking organisations (CGKRB, 2012; 
FATF, 2012; Shelley, 2010). Likewise, an effective financial investigation 
mirrors the findings of the principal criminal investigation (BE-E10). 
Accordingly, thorough financial inquiries are highly relevant to the issue 
of providing evidence (BE-E5; BE-E14; Brown et al., 2012). As yet, this 
case building potential is clearly underused (Kruisbergen et al., 2016). In 
effect, financial investigations have demonstrated their added value in 
supporting the charge of criminal conspiracy or criminal organisation 
(BE-E5; CGKRB, 2012; Leman & Janssens, 2015). As specified above, 
money is what ties the different parts of a human trafficking operation 
together. Consequently, delving into those finances is one of the few 
ways to take hold of the elusive men behind the curtain or top tiers 
of the human trafficking business when dealing with more sophisticated 
trafficking rings (BE-E5). Ultimately, knowing where the funds come from 
and where they go sheds a different light on a traffic that is difficult to 
chart directly (Kopp, 2012).
With regard to the purpose of confiscation, two methods can be used 
to determine the size of a trafficker’s illicit fortune (BE-E14). The method 
4. FINANCIAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THB CRIMES: 
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of asset evaluation consists of stacking up the capital one has amassed 
over a suspicious period of time against the defendant’s legal income in 
pursuance of demonstrating unexplained wealth (Brown, 2013). Alternatively, 
investigators turn to the direct calculation of criminally obtained assets. 
As far as sexual exploitation is concerned, the asset investigation and 
recovery unit of the Belgian Federal police is disposed to working out 
the total of criminal earnings or assisting human trafficking investigators 
in this calculation. Though conventionally, the calculation of criminal 
proceeds is seen as a standard investigative practice (BE-E6; BE-E14). 
The overall takings of a sex trafficking operation typically correspond 
to the sum of the number of identified victims, how much the victims 
have earned, and how much these trafficked individuals had to hand 
over to their exploiters (BE-E6). In the case of labour exploitation, social 
inspection services are usually entrusted with calculating the proceeds 
(BE-E1; BE-E2; BE-E4). The criminal financial gain in labour trafficking 
rests on two key elements, namely unpaid wages and unpaid social 
contributions (BE-E2; BE-E4; BE-E9). The total proceeds of a labour 
trafficking business are further shaped by factors such as the duration 
of employment, working hours, the type of labour involved, and so on 
(BE-E9). Parenthetically, the calculation of criminal proceeds is a telling 
way of quantifying the infraction (BE-E4). As a rule, operating costs are 
not brought into the equation (BE-E3), for the reason that confiscation is 
the first and foremost reason for calculating criminal assets.
Although invaluable to disrupting human trafficking operations, financial 
investigations are bound by considerable challenges and numerous practical 
problems. Going down the rabbit hole of criminal finances is an inherently 
time-consuming endeavour (BE-E4; BE-E7; BE-E8; BE-E14). However, lengthy 
investigations run counter to the principle of reasonable delay and the 
fact that a lot of non-resident defendants are held in temporary custody 
implies that human trafficking investigations are regularly conducted under 
pressure of time (BE-E4; BE-E7). In a similar vein, financial investigations are 
hampered by a general lack of resources (BE-E4; BE-E8; BE-E10; Delepière 
et al., 2013). This problem is exacerbated by the oftentimes complicated 
nature of human trafficking cases (BE-E1; BE-E2; BE-E4; BE-E5; BE-E7), 
which require the involvement of specialised investigators (BE-E1; BE-E4; 
BE-E7) and by the extensive use of counter-strategies. Whereas financial 
investigations move slow, the flow of financial transactions is immensely 
faster than the ability of investigative authorities to track them (BE-E4; 
OSCE, 2014).
The international aspect integral to most human trafficking operations 
complicates matters even more (Brown et al., 2012; Delepière et al., 2013; 
Soudijn, 2014). Over the years, the response to human trafficking has 
been raised to an transnational level in order to meet this complexity (de 
Jager et al., 2016; Goodey, 2008). Traditionally, international cooperation 
takes the form of written requests for mutual legal assistance or letters 
rogatory. However, this approach is virtually impracticable in the face 
of complex cross-border cases (Spapens, 2011). That is, requests for 
judicial assistance tend to be rather laborious (BE-E11; BE-E13). Parallel 
investigations and joined investigation teams (JITs), on the contrary, are 
intended to cut back on this tedious to-ing and fro-ing. The added value 
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of JITs in particular lies in the facilitation of exchanging information and 
expertise (BE-E12) (OSCE, 2013). In addition, JITs enable investigators 
to follow the money trail beyond national borders, thus expediting the 
confiscation of criminal assets abroad (BE-E5; BE-E11). The last few years 
have shown a marked increase in the use of JITs in human trafficking 
cases (Eurojust, 2017). In turn, the use of JITs is only gradually gaining 
foothold in Belgium (BE-E1). On the whole, international collaboration 
in human trafficking investigations has known widely varying degrees of 
success (BE-E10; BE-E11; BE-E12). Even so, transnational cooperation is 
of vital importance, as one could seriously question the effectiveness of 
tackling a phenomenon that essentially drifts between nations on a local 
level (BE-E5; BE-E9; BE-E13). Besides, increasing international collaboration 
advances a better understanding of the transnational dimension of the 
human trafficking business (Leman & Janssens, 2015).
All things considered, the adage that trafficking in human beings is a 
low risk, high pay-off crime still stands (FATF, 2011; Finance Against 
Trafficking, 2014; OSCE, 2013). In the first place, the human trafficking 
business is set apart by a remarkably low market entry barrier (Kopp, 
2012; Wheaton et al., 2010). Whereas exploitative practices yield 
considerable profits, the associated risks are close to negligible. Seeing 
that trafficking in human beings offences are notoriously difficult to 
prove (Balarezo, 2013; Eurojust, 2015; UNODC, 2016), the conviction 
rates for this type of transgression are relatively low (Kara, 2011; OSCE, 
2013; Wheaton et al., 2010). Furthermore, those who are convicted 
for trafficking offences are usually met with rather feeble prison terms 
(Balarezo, 2013; Kara, 2011). In general, the bulk of human trafficking 
convicts received no prison time or a partially or fully suspended 
prison sentence (U.S. Department of State, 2017). As for Belgium, half 
of the prison sentences for human trafficking offences in 2016 ranged 
between one and three years (Myria, 2017). Accordingly, increasing the 
risks should be regarded as a fundamental policy direction (Bouché & 
Shady, 2017). Per contra, raising the costs of human trafficking would 
be to no avail, as passing on expenditures to victims and clients is 
ingrained in the trafficking business model. Related to the low risk 
nature of this criminal enterprise is the fact that human trafficking is a 
severely under-detected offence (Goodey, 2008; Guia, 2015; Kleemans 
& Smit, 2014). There are a number of conceivable ways to counteract 
this problem. Raising awareness, educating frontline practitioners, and 
building expertise among investigative authorities is pivotal in uncovering 
a crime that hides in plain sight (BE-E2; BE-E6; Aronowitz et al., 2010). 
Bearing in mind that a number of trafficking modalities rely on public 
venues, such as bars and massage parlours, which require a permit 
from the local municipality (Weitzer, 2014b), an administrative approach 
to trafficking in human beings would undoubtedly reinforce efforts to 
expose exploitative practices (BE-E11; Aronowitz et al., 2010). Against 
this background, it is important to note that, under the influence 
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of technological advancements, the market of sex trafficking has 
broadly shifted from public to more private forms of prostitution. This 
displacement evidently broadens the issue of detection from patrolling 
red light districts to monitoring websites and private venues. More 
generally, advancements in communication and technology have shaped 
the current human trafficking business model to a certain extent and 
will continue to do so in the future. In this irrevocable evolution lies 
a considerable challenge for investigative authorities and policy makers 
(BE-E13; BE-E14).
On the subject of investigating human trafficking offences, law enforcement 
agencies often lack the incentive to peg away at financial data, whereas 
financial investigators are generally pressed for knowledge of human 
trafficking operations (OSCE, 2014). Traditionally, investigators have been 
more interested in the criminal activity itself rather than its financial 
bearings (Kruisbergen et al., 2016; Soudijn, 2014). The two are nevertheless 
inherently linked. As a consequence, creating synergies between human 
trafficking investigators and financial investigators is crucial in terms of 
assuring a comprehensive response (BE-E12; BE-E14). Efforts to combat 
human trafficking should not only transcend law enforcement bounds, 
but also national borders where needed (BE-E3; BE-E9). International 
cooperation is pivotal in connection with preventing displacement effects 
(Aronowitz, 2001) and confiscating criminal assets abroad (Kruisbergen et 
al., 2016; Savona & Riccardi, 2015). One should, however, bear in mind 
that, even though depriving a trafficking ring from its criminal proceedings 
can have a disrupting or disheartening effect, the low monetary threshold 
associated with starting a human trafficking operation implies that taking 
away financial resources does not necessarily serve the purpose of taking 
out these criminal organisations indefinitely.
The issue of trafficking in persons is in fact a composite of multifarious 
networks and manners of operating. Turning the tables on human 
traffickers, therefore, requires a tailored response (Efrat, 2016). Knowing 
when to wield the scalpel and when the elephant gun lies at the very 
heart of posing multifaceted solutions to an equally diversified problem 
(Shelley, 2010). Accordingly, the response to human trafficking should 
cover more of a nuanced approach than mere criminal prosecution 
(Davies, 2017; Efrat, 2016). In this context, a convenient point of entry is 
the interlacing between upper- and underworld. By means of dislodging 
criminal infiltration of the licit economy, financial investigations present 
opportunities for disrupting criminal organisations beyond asset recovery 
(Brown, 2013; Roudaut, 2011).
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LIST OF INTERVIEwEES
Respondent 
code
Position/department Institution/Role
BE-E1 Head of Central Human
Trafficking Unit
Belgian Federal Police
BE-E2 Head of Human Trafficking 
Directorate
Inspectorate of the National Social Security
Office, Belgium
BE-E3 Strategic Analyst Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit
(CTIF-CFI)
BE-E4 Head of Human Trafficking Unit Inspectorate of the National Social Security
Office, Belgium
BE-E5 Policy Analyst Federal Migration Centre Myria, Belgium
BE-E6 Head of Prostitution Unit Belgian Local Police
BE-E7 Legal Expert Specialized Reception Centre for Victims
of Human Trafficking, Belgium
BE-E8 Labour Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
BE-E9 Labour Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
BE-E10 Labour Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
BE-E11 Public Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
BE-E12 Head of Human Trafficking Unit Belgian Federal Police
BE-E13 Public Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
BE-E14 Head of Asset Investigation
and Recovery Unit
Belgian Federal Police
BE-E15 Strategic Analyst Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit
(CTIF-CFI)
BE-E16 Labour Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
BE-C1 Criminal Entrepreneur Souteneur
BE-C2 Criminal Entrepreneur Employer
BE-C3 Criminal Entrepreneur Souteneur
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